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Searching for and detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and similar hazards has become increasingly important in law enforcement and military applications. Training for IED detection can be significantly enhanced through the use of cognitively based training to augment field training methods. The present research addressed cognitive issues in IED detection and training. Five major types of errors in search and detection were identified and characterized. A cognitively based training program was developed and provided to eliminate these errors. Two experiments were conducted. The results demonstrated that this training, termed the “SMOKE” system (after the acronym for the five error types—errors of Search, Movement, Observation, failures to Keep Searching, and errors of Evaluation), significantly improved IED search and detection. Trainees were substantially more successful in detecting a spectrum of mock hazardous devices, were faster at detecting less well hidden hazards, and were less prone to specific error types than were respondents in control comparison groups. These findings demonstrated the utility of cognitively based IED search training, to be conducted in tandem with comprehensive field training methods for the development of effective IED search and detection skills.
Results and Discussion
Speed and accuracy of detection. For this experiment, with its three devices which were either simple, moderate, or difficult to detect, two factors were important. The first, as in Experiment 1, was detection time. The second was whether detection was accomplished at all. The effect of training on detection was significant. Participants in the training condition were significantly more likely to detect all three devices than were those in the control condition, χ2 (1) = 4.57, p = .032. Twelve of twenty-three training respondents (52%) successfully detected all three devices; only five of twenty-three control respondents (22%) did so.
As in Experiment 1, the effect of participant gender was not significant. However, in terms of simple-device detection time, male performance was 40.10% superior to that of females. The fact that this relatively large difference was non-significant again reflects very large standard deviations. This large disparity in the performance of females and males may reflect the influence of social expectations. We have previously provided evidence that gender-based expectations can reduce women’s visual/spatial cognitive performance relative to that of men in task contexts in which no sex difference is observed when those expectations are removed (Sharps, Welton, & Price, 1993; Sharps, Price, & Williams, 1994). Regardless, this result underscores the importance of understanding individual differences in this area.
Again as in Experiment 1, trained respondents (mean detection time 18.28 seconds, SD = 13.21 seconds) found the “simple” device significantly faster than did control respondents (mean 34.14 seconds, SD = 22.13 seconds), F (1, 44) = 8.72, p = .005. This reflected a 47% advantage in time to detection as a result of training, similar to the 53% observed in Experiment 1.
Training did not result in enhanced detection speed for the moderately difficult device, nor, interestingly, did it enhance the likelihood of finding this device significantly. This will be further discussed below in the “Error Analysis” section with reference to errors of movement.
Perhaps the most important results involve the detection of the difficult device. Real devices are most likely to be concealed and the best-concealed of the mock IEDs used here was the stick-timer grenade, which was concealed in the shadows beneath an office chair and placed parallel to one of the chair’s horizontal supports. Training did not enhance the speed of detection of this device, but it did dramatically enhance the ability of trainees to find it at all. Only five of the control-group respondents found the difficult device. However, twelve of the respondents in the training group did so. The difference was significant, χ2 (1) = 4.57, p = .032. Not only were respondents in the training condition faster at detecting the simple device, they were more likely to detect all three devices, including the complex device—the IED which was most difficult to find.
Error analysis. These results are presented in Table 1. The training provided in this experiment significantly reduced the average number of errors across three of the five error types. Errors of SEARCH were significantly reduced, F (1,44) = 6.77, p = .013, as were errors of OBSERVATION, F (1, 44) = 19.48, p < .001, and failures to KEEP SEARCHING, F (1, 44) = 31.26, p < .001.
Trainees, as opposed to respondents in the control group, were more likely to engage in a comprehensive search of the room, examining all quadrants and searching above, below, and at their line of sight for IEDs. They were also more likely to identify and report an IED when they saw one. Finally, trainees were more likely to continue their search for additional IEDs even when they had already identified one. Thus, the training provided in Experiment 2 resulted in a significant advantage in IED search and detection beyond the levels observed with the control group.
Errors of Evaluation were not reduced by the training. Those who received training were just as likely to identify an innocuous object as a potential IED as those who did not. This result may in fact be construed as salutary. In a potentially IED-rich environment, it is far more dangerous to mistake an IED for an innocuous object than it is to mistake an innocuous object for an IED. The degree to which this may prove important in the field should be the subject of further research.
Errors of Movement also were not significantly reduced by the training provided. This speaks directly to the finding cited above with reference to the “moderate” device—the fact that our training did nothing to improve the detection of this device. Although the device, a single-pipe bomb, was situated in plain sight, it was only in plain sight from a specific perspective within the field test chamber. The moderate IED was placed between a computer and its printer. It was not directly visible unless the participant moved to a position in which there was a direct line of sight to its location.
The training provided was presented in a PowerPoint presentation. Trainees did not move during the training; they were seated before a screen on which the presentation was made. Therefore, although they were informed of the need to move about any given environment to enhance their perspective, they received no direct motor training in this crucial aspect of search.
Was this the reason for the absence of a training effect for the moderate device? An additional analysis was conducted to address this question. We correlated the presence of errors of Movement with the amount of time needed to detect each device. Errors of Movement were significantly correlated with the amount of time needed to detect the moderate device, r (22) = 0.59, p < .001. No such correlation was observed with the simple or complex device. Thus, errors of Movement, which were not reduced by SMOKE training in isolation, were the most probable explanation for the anomalous results observed with the moderate device.
This result strongly underscores a point made above: SMOKE training, the front-loaded, explicit, feature-intensive training system presented here, cannot replace field training. Rather, it is presented as a powerful adjunct to field training. The present findings indicate that the SMOKE system must be accompanied by rigorous field training, in realistic environments, for the detection of IEDs. Trainees in possession of the cognitive skills engendered by SMOKE must search realistic mock environments as well, in order to foster the movement skills needed for successful searches and also to fine-tune the skills acquired in the SMOKE training for real-world environments. From the perspective of cognitive science, the SMOKE system should be presented, followed by realistic training provided by field training experts, and then presented again; this will optimize both the primacy and recency effects (see Baddeley, 1990; Crowder, 1976; also see Sharps et al., 1996) for optimal memory and retention of the training, as discussed above.
Cognitively based training such as SMOKE cannot, and is not intended to, replace solid field training. However, the present experiments have demonstrated that such training provides a powerful cognitive framework for successful field training, and for ultimate success at IED search and detection.
Individual differences. Interestingly, neither of the scales of the Shipley instrument, which deals with general cognitive functioning, was related to successful searches across conditions of detection difficulty. Neither were the scales of the Digit Span, which deals with attentional and short-term memory capabilities, nor our adaptation of the Rey-Ostereith figure, which deals with the ability to perceive and remember a complex visual pattern.
However, a more interesting pattern was observed with reference to the “difficult” IED condition alone, which presented the most realistic of the three mock IEDs presented in the field test evolution. In the control condition, none of the individual-difference measures manifested significance. However, across the control and training conditions, performance on the Rey-Ostereith figure was in fact significantly related to the ability to detect the difficult device, F (1, 30) = 4.39, p = .045. In the training condition, this significance was maintained, F (1, 12) = 11.70, p = .005. The Shipley Abstractions scale also proved to be related to performance in the training condition, F (1, 12) = 4.90, p = .047.
The most parsimonious explanation of this pattern of results follows. Neither intellect, short-term memory, attention, nor even the ability to remember a complex visual pattern predicted the ability to search for and detect IEDs in the absence of cognitively based training. However, what was predicted by our adaptation of the Rey-Ostereith figure and by the Shipley Abstractions elements, was the ability to benefit from the training provided within the SMOKE framework, at least with reference to more difficult and therefore more realistic IEDs. Those with better abstraction powers benefited more from the training than did those without. Perhaps more importantly, the ability to remember and process a complex visual figure (the Rey-Ostereith) was also directly related to the ability to benefit from SMOKE training. These are preliminary results, of course, and further research will be absolutely necessary to verify and, if appropriate, to extend them; but these findings strongly indicate the potential for an empirically-based pathway to predict those who are more likely to benefit from cognitively based IED search and detection training.
General Discussion
Taken together, these experiments have demonstrated the following:
Five specific types of errors characterize unsuccessful search and detection of IEDs. These are described in detail above.
Cognitively based, front-loaded, explicit, feature-intensive training can be used to reduce many of these errors significantly, and to provide superior performance in the detection of IEDs, as suggested by earlier work (e.g, Sharps, 2003, 2010).
The effects of such training are strong in isolation; however, it is highly probable that far stronger and more salutary effects will be achieved in combination with a comprehensive program of realistic field training.
It may be possible to predict the probability that a given trainee will benefit substantially from this type of training, based on his or her capabilities with reference to abstraction and to the recall and processing of complex visual stimuli. However, further research is absolutely essential on this issue.
Effective search and detection of IEDs is of substantial importance now, and is likely to assume even greater importance in the future (e.g., Cameron, 2008). The present results have demonstrated the importance of front-loaded, explicit, feature-intensive training (see Sharps, 2003, 2010) as a powerful adjunct to field training methods already in use.
It is of paramount importance to conduct additional research to determine the most important components of this training and the degree to which individual differences may be used to predict trainee success. It is also important to determine the generality of these results across populations, especially with reference to age and experience. Additional research should also address the degree to which the SMOKE method is used consciously by trainees in their approach to field evolutions. Ultimately, however, the present findings serve to underscore the importance of a cognitive approach to IED search and detection and the degree to which this approach has immediate practical benefits for the training of law enforcement, military, and appropriate civilian constituencies in an increasingly risky world. It is hoped that the inclusion of the type of training elucidated in the present experiments will reap substantial benefits, especially for law enforcement and for those charged with homeland security, in terms of enhanced officer survivability, professional effectiveness, and enhanced abilities to protect the civilian population.
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Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Chief of Police Jerry Dyer and the staff and officers of the Fresno Police Department for their unstinting expert advice, generosity, and support of this research. Thanks also to Sergeant Michael Manfredi of the Fresno Police Department, and to Lisa Giuliani, Amy Balmanno, and Morgan Goodwin for their help in the preparation of the materials for this research. The research, views, and opinions presented in this paper are entirely and solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Fresno Police Department or of its Chief of Police, staff, officers, or employees.
by David Fair, PhD, CHS-IV
I recently returned from Haiti after a medical mission trip with Hope for Haiti. Our five-person team joined Hope International at Fort Liberte, Haiti, north of the “red zone” where patients and evacuees from the devastated area joined locals in seeking care at Fort Liberty Hospital.
The congested facility was already filled with individuals in need of help. Many found a measure of relief with the augmentation of American doctors and nurses to the existing staff, who brought much-needed drugs and supplies to the facility.
The Port-au-Prince area was hit the hardest by the 7.0-magnitude earthquake that occurred on January 12, 2010. The earthquake left one-third of Haiti’s 9 million inhabitants in need of immediate humanitarian assistance. In addition to the tremendous death toll and countless injuries suffered by the Haitian people, the United Nations peacekeepers suffered a grievous loss of facilities and personnel as well.
The UN Mission to Stabilize Haiti (MINUSTAH) plays a major role in Haiti, providing both troops and police officers for the country. And despite MINUSTAH’s own losses, it has geared up to continue its important mission.
In January, shortly after the disaster, the UN Security Council backed a call to increase the overall force levels of the United Nations peacekeeping mission to Haiti to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction, and stabilization efforts that followed the earthquake.
The council was asked for an additional 1,500 police officers and 2,000 troops to reinforce MINUSTAH, augmenting the UN group’s 9,000 uniformed personnel already on the ground.
The council, in unanimously adopting Resolution 1908, decided that MINUSTAH would consist of 8,940 troops of all ranks and a police component of up to 3,711 police, and it would keep these new levels under review.
UN Police and Haitian National Police were both present at the Fort Liberte Hospital. And while my primary responsibility with the medical mission was to offer spiritual care and psychological support for our team, patients, and hospital staff, my concern extended to the already overworked UN and Haitian law enforcement officials.
Despite their presence, our team elected to hire our own security and translators because existing resources were stretched so thinly.
We met with the mayor of Fort Liberte, Charles Pierre. He told us that many of the police officers had suffered their own losses-—family members and friends—in the earthquake. The effects of stress weighed heavily on the officers. Pierre also noted that police officers had died both on and off duty and it added to the grief and suffering of the law enforcement contingent.
Additionally, according to Pierre, “when there was a death at the hospital, especially that of a child, or when there was equipment or other shortages,” it had a detrimental effect on the officers.
It was common for the Haitian hospital staff to leave the hospital around 9:00 p.m. and to not return until the next morning, leaving the patients in the hands of family members and friends who chose to stay with them.
Additionally, the electricity generators were turned off at night because gasoline is very expensive. Since no surgeries or procedures were performed at night and the staff had gone home for the night, there was no reason for the expensive generators to continue running. We found this practice throughout Haiti. At night, nearly all generators were shut down; people functioned through the use of fires, candles, or other means.
In Quanamithe, Haiti, we visited the orphanages for children who had lost their parents in the earthquake. They too were left in the dark after the generators were shut down at 6 p.m.
I noted that the concerns of Haitian police officers were not unlike the concerns of our fellow peace officers at home—we are severely affected by the deaths of children and equipment shortages or equipment failures that make doing our jobs difficult.
People are people. And within the law enforcement and military communities, we are brothers and sisters. I recall a bus ride back to the Dominican Republic upon which I encountered a uniformed Dominican soldier. While we didn’t speak each other’s language, we shook hands and locked arms as a show of unity and determination to help the Haitians. The Dominican Republic has already committed 800 soldiers to the Haitian recovery effort.
At the Fort Liberte Hospital, we were frequently visited by UN police officers. Those I met were from Romania and the United States. A female Romanian officer, who had previously served two years in Haiti, took a year off and returned for another two years. The American officer from Florida had served at the nearby UN compound since late 2009.
I learned from speaking with the Haitian national police officers and Mayor Charles Pierre that they have no concept of police chaplaincy like we have in the US to support their officers. The idea was completely foreign to them. We did, however, settle on the term “police pastors,” and that helped clarify the role.
Because my background includes both serving as a law enforcement officer and as a police chaplain, I discussed with the mayor and his cousin, a local pastor, the possibility of training local Fort Liberte ministers to become police pastors on a future trip. They were very open to the idea.
In my opinion, the media has given the Haitian people a bad rap. We found them to be loving, compassionate, and very appreciative of the services we offered.
Our team made a commitment to return to Haiti and its people soon to continue to help and empower them to help each other.
We felt our mission was a tremendous success. We treated all types of injuries and ills and dispensed more than 200 pairs of glasses, allowing some Haitians to see clearly for the first time in their lives.
On the last Friday we were in the country it was a national day of prayer. We joined Haitians in their prayers for their country and its people. One of the popular songs written for that day declared that God remembers Haiti and that Haitians remember God.
Long after the news media and superstars leave, Haiti will continue to have needs for many more years to come. Each of us can do our part. Everyone may not able to go to Haiti, but everyone can do something.
As we ask God to remember Haiti, we ask you, too, to remember the country and its wonderful people. H
Chaplain Fair will present “Homeland Security Chaplaincy” on Thursday, September 23rd at the ABCHS National Conference in Orlando, Florida.
The following interview was made possible through the collaborative efforts and leadership of Dr. Robert O’Block, the founder of ABCHS, the first certification program in homeland security. He, along with the editorial staff of Inside Homeland Security®, participated in this interview in order to bring our members and readers the latest insight and reviews of critical issues, policies, and protocols currently affecting the national security of the United States through the eyes of exceptional and prominent national leaders.
Introduction
During my more than 30 years with the intelligence community, I have followed numerous terrorist organizations. Few have been as innovative and resilient as al-Qaeda. Rarely a week goes by that we don’t read about an al-Qaeda or Taliban commander being arrested or killed. Our instrument of choice is often a predator drone and most of the intelligence is collected through state-of-the-art intercept operations, confirmed by Predator and other imagery, as well as through more aggressive collection efforts by friendly liaison services. Though we periodically read pronouncements that al-Qaeda is on the ropes and its demise is imminent, it has been my experience that only a few months later we learn that the organization has reconstituted itself, like the phoenix rising from the ashes, and is operating in a new, mutated, and more lethal form.
Dr. Wecht is an honorary Life Fellow of ACFEI and chair of the American Board of Forensic Medicine and the ACFEI Executive Advisory Board. He received his MD from the University of Pittsburgh and his JD from the University of Maryland. He is certified by the American Board of Pathology in anatomic, clinical, and forensic pathology. He is a charter Diplomate of the American Board of Disaster Medicine and served as chairman of that board. He is actively involved as a medical-legal forensic science consultant, author, and lecturer. Dr. Wecht served 20 years as elected coroner of Allegheny County in Pennsylvania, and has performed approxi-mately 16,000 autopsies, while assisting on 36,000 additional autopsies. He has testified in more than 1,000 civil, criminal, and worker’s compensation cases in more than 30 states. He is the author or co-author of 44 books, including the five-volume set Forensic Sciences (Matthew Bender), and two three-volume sets—Handling Soft Tissue Injury Cases and Preparing and Winning Medical-Negligence Cases.
Q. Where do you see the future of forensics?
A. I see increased utilization of forensic scientific technology and principles in civil and criminal cases, as well as the development of new, revised, and increasingly sophisticated scientific techniques.
Q. How do you determine which cases you investigate?
A. As an independent, medical-legal, forensic scientific consultant, I respond to all inquiries and formal requests. I do not pick and choose the cases in which I become involved. Once I am on board, I undertake a complete and thorough investigation in all my cases.
Q. Is there one particular case that was more challenging than the others?
A. There have been many highly challenging cases throughout my career in both the civil and criminal fields. The JFK assassination remains, after 45 years, the most important, controversial, and challenging case of my near half-century career.
Q. How has the popularity of forensic shows like CSI and others affected the field?
A. CSI shows have had a significant impact on both the civil and criminal justice systems. Jurors have come to expect all kinds of special forensic revelations in cases that involve medical and scientific issues. As a result, civil and criminal defense trial attorneys have had to become more aware and knowledgeable about the overall field of forensic science. Likewise, trial judges have also become more cognizant and appreciative of the relevance and significance of forensic scientific evidence and expertise in dealing with various kinds of both civil and criminal matters.
Q. What can attendees expect to take away from your session at the conference?
A. Attendees of the 2010 ACFEI National Conference will acquire a great amount of knowledge regarding the various forensic scientific specialties with emphasis on the recognition and utilization of such evidence in civil and criminal litigation.
Q. How has ACFEI grown and changed during your time as a member? Why is it important for professionals to be active members in the association?
A. The ACFEI continues to grow in several respects. Through the adoption of increasingly challenging certification processes, the professional reputation and stature of the ACFEI has been significantly enhanced.
The 2009 National Academy of Sciences Report deals with the status of forensic science in the U.S. and strongly emphasized the need to recognize and correct long-standing deficiencies and mistaken concepts, improve educational programs, and require certification of forensic science experts.
Q. Anything else you would like to add?
A. The ACFEI has accepted this NAS Report and has undertaken to enhance the role of professional individuals involved in various forensic scientific and medical-legal endeavors through educational programs and stringent certification processes.
By Eric White
Retail, the second-largest industry in the US, generates $3.8 trillion in annual revenues and employs 12% of the American workforce. The retail industry fuels our economy, supplies our nation, and represents the very heart of capitalism and everything extremist groups hate about Americans and our way of life. Not only would a successful attack in a densely populated retail environment represent a symbolic blow to the Western way of life, it would also cause significant disruption to the US economy. It would create fear among consumers and slow retail sales. The iconic status of large and successful retail companies fuels terrorists’ desires to inflict destruction on them individually or collectively, and by disrupting the retail environment it could affect the public’s ability to access essential medication, food, and supplies.
However, retailers are limited in their ability to collect data, develop intelligence, and prevent acts of terrorism. They are primarily focused on business operations, efficiency, and maintaining margins, as they should be. At the same time, the risks are too great for both retailers and the nation to allow retailers to go unprepared for disaster.
In addition to being an appealing target for terrorists, retailers also face a common set of vulnerabilities. Retail stores offer open environments in which the public is welcome to come and go without security screenings. The consequences of security screenings or profiling in a retail environment would create fear and animosity in lawful customers and cause them to shop elsewhere. From a business continuity standpoint, large retailers use technology and some of the best logistics experts to get the right freight to a store at the right time. Controlling inventory levels is a critical component of the retail profit equation. This “just in time” philosophy and the tendency to leverage supplier convergence to receive the greatest discounts and achieve the most efficient operations are tenets of sophisticated retail operations. The more retailers control their supply pipeline and rely on single suppliers, the greater their risk if an incident were to interrupt the supply chain.
In addition, more and more merchandise purchased in U.S. retail stores is sourced from other countries. The 9/11 Commission Report identified container security as a primary vulnerability for the United States. While customs and border protection officials do their best to screen cargo, it is simply impossible to screen all containers effectively and also maintain the efficiency retailers require. An attack on our domestic port infrastructure or major ports of origin around the world, could significantly slow the receipt of needed merchandise and create unmanageable burdens for security inspections on government agencies or private companies.
These vulnerabilities are not only a risk to retailers, but endanger the entire country. The potential for economic damage is clearly serious; however, as a part of the private sector, retailers are often left without the vital information and resources needed to help prevent a terrorist attack or to respond to actionable intelligence.
While federal agencies strive to collect information, sort out threats from non-threats, and identify terrorism trends, they have not yet established an effective channel of communication and collaboration with retail and other private-sector industries. It is a challenging task, but the ability to mitigate risk as a result could be significant. The shortfalls as they stand now make collaboration difficult.
Lack of Communication
Public/private sector information sharing has been a topic of discussion for a decade. Public agencies only recently have recognized the value of developing open lines of communication with the private sector, specifically retail. Suspicious individuals, known terrorists, and aberrant behavior may be witnessed in private sector institutions and, if they have established rapport with local law enforcement or federal homeland security professionals, they can often provide vital information that could prevent an attack.
Unfortunately, in the vast majority of cases, the information simply “dies on the vine,” due to the lack of an effective clearinghouse. The reported information either falls through the cracks or is never shared because of the risk of liability incurred by the retailer. Too often, fear of retaliation by the media or special interest groups, or being labeled a “terror-phobe,” overrides the impulse to report concerning activities.
The power of collaboration and information sharing is demonstrated by the case dubbed “Operation Blackbird,” in which individuals with ties to known terrorists used the theft and resale of baby formula to finance terrorist activities. After a truckload of baby formula driven by a known terrorist was seized in Texas, police began to collaborate with the FBI on the investigation. The National Retail Federation (NRF) compiled a 200-page report highlighting organized retail theft of baby formula across the nation, amounting to $7 billion in retail theft. This problem has been pinpointed; now, retailers and the FBI have a case study to help find solutions for sharing insight and details on this issue.
Conflicting Objectives
Retailers are caught between their desire to provide information that may be related to national security and protecting themselves against lawsuits and “trial by media.” Consider this example: if a retail photo processing center receives photos dropped off by a man of Middle-Eastern descent containing detailed images of the inside of the White House and photos of stockpiled weapons, the retailer should rightfully be concerned. Often, because there is no direct access to a particular federal agency, the retailer’s only recourse is to make a report to local law enforcement or, worse yet, do nothing. The police may question the suspect but do not have much more than suspicion to follow up on the lead. The individual, or special interest groups designed to distract public attention from a growing problem and focus media attention on civil rights, may then attempt to sue the retailer for sharing the individual’s personal information, or for racial profiling. For these reasons, the retailer incurs a significant risk when it makes the decision to help authorities. The decision to report suspicious activity simply cannot be that difficult if we truly want to develop the intelligence necessary to protect our country in today’s dangerous environment.
When instructions are clear and retailers are protected, they are free to share the information authorities need. By contrast, consider the issue of child pornography. This crime is carefully regulated, and retailers are instructed to submit questionable photos of children for investigation. Because this is a mandate by each state, retailers in those states have an element of legal protection from lawsuits when submitting information, making it much easier and less painful for them to do the right thing.
One-way Information
The Patriot Act enables and requires private institutions to share suspicious financial information with federal agencies. It is, however, mostly one-sided, providing only facts with little context. For this reason, information is far more likely to be pushed up to federal agencies from retailers, but retailers rarely receive actionable information in return. With respect to the purchase of merchandise, much more can be done. Retailers could be told, for example, that they should be wary of high-volume purchases of a particular item or substance, but are not told details about the concern that would help them to effectively contribute to the investigation. A two-way flow of information is most effective.
The Value Retailers Can Provide
The potential for retailers to actively contribute to the war on terrorism is tremendous. For one thing, retailers have a wealth of grassroot level information that could reveal trends as well as specifics regarding terrorist activities at their roots. Consider retailers’ unique access to information on the ground and across the nation regarding the purchase of potentially hazardous substances. Point-of-sale systems capture information regarding purchasers of particular items, the volume purchased, combinations of purchases, and how they were paid for. Retailers are experts at analyzing this type of data to help market to the individual customers who shop there. The potential for retailers to flag transactions in which certain combinations of products are purchased together, or to note when volume purchases of certain items exceed an acceptable level, could be extremely valuable in tracking down specific individuals as well as to better understand how these terrorists conduct their work, or the geographic areas in which they are active. This kind of information is critical to federal agencies, but is often too granular and localized to be gleaned on its own. Retailers also operate some of the most well placed video surveillance systems, often both inside and outside their stores. Local authorities often rely on this capability when trying to piece together crimes in their community. It is much less likely these assets will be used to identify potential terrorists or concerning activity. The addition of video analysis has promulgated itself throughout the retail industry. According to Simmons Market Research, on any given Saturday between 2 and 4 p.m., nearly 35 million Americans will shop in retail stores. Chances are good that a few of them are up to no good, and federal agents would love to know who and where they are. Retailers might be able to tell them if they were just asked and given a modest level of support.
Retailers are also exceptional at responding to a crisis. Time after time, following hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and other disasters of all kinds, retailers have demonstrated their ability to pick up, improvise where necessary and provide both business continuity as well as needed supplies and resources. Retailers are nimble, resourceful, and well trained on disaster response, allowing them to respond more effectively than other organizations. Given an understanding of the likely impact, location, and some other details, retailers can construct response plans that will help ensure quick recovery and critical aid to needed areas following a terrorist attack. Coordinating these capabilities in pre-planning exercises with federal officials, a more complete picture of resources and capabilities in specific U.S. regions can be created.
Leveraging Every Tool Available
The Department of Homeland Security’s urgent mission is to lead the unified national effort to secure the country and preserve our freedoms. While the DHS was created to secure our country against those who seek to disrupt the American way of life, its charter also includes preparation for and response to all hazards and disasters.
Retailers and homeland security professionals have practical business reasons and a patriotic duty to prepare for terrorist acts. The shared goal is to prevent or minimize casualties and the destruction of property and to provide business continuity as quickly as possible following a terrorist event. Awareness of risk is the first step toward protecting their critical operations, but they are also willing and able to harmonize efforts to assist in the broader mission. It only makes sense to use every asset in our arsenal to combat the threats to this nation, as it is certain that terrorists are using every tool in theirs.
White will present “Special Attention Required: Security and Response Planning for Special Events” on Thursday, September 23rd at the 2010 ABCHS national conference in Orlando, Florida.
Psychosocial Aspects and Indicators
There are two kinds of serial killers as far as the victim is concerned: the kind that you don’t see before they pounce on you and the kind you see and don’t expect to pounce on you.
—Pat Brown, criminal profiler
During a personal interview, one of the most recognized authorities in the field of death and dying, Elisabeth Kubler-Ross, M.D., discussed the early influences in life that led her to pursue this particular field of study. Her response was nothing shy of incredible and illuminating.
As a young woman traveling from Switzerland, Dr. Kubler-Ross visited the Nazi con-centration camp known as Maidanek, where she engaged in a conversation with another visitor. This particular Jewish woman was revisiting what Dr. Kubler-Ross quickly discovered to be the nightmares of her childhood. The Jewish woman explained how she had lost her entire family in the camp and how they had been executed in the Nazi gas chambers. To worsen the painful memories of the loss of her family, she shared how she, too, was supposed to die with them on that day, but was pulled out of the chamber because the gates could not be closed. Her life was spared on that day because the additional body of a little girl prevented the Nazi Germans from closing the gates of a machine designed to maliciously slaughter innocent Jews with wanton disregard—a machine that reportedly contributed to the killing of almost half a million Jews between February 1942 and July 1944.16 She went on to disclose that she remembered wanting to survive the terrible ordeal and have the opportunity to share with the world exactly what happened inside that concentration camp. However, when the Russian troops came to liberate the few remaining Jews, she remembered thinking, “If I spend the rest of my life telling about all these horrible things, I would not be any better than Hitler himself. I would plant seeds of hate and negativity.”17
After her visit at Maidanek was finished, Dr. Kubler-Ross became ill and began to hitchhike back to Switzerland. It was at this point in the interview that I read the most interesting confession. The interview goes on as follows and Dr. Kubler-Ross explained:
And I thought, ‘She is crazy, I don’t have a Hitler in me.’ A few days later, I hitchhiked back to Switzerland, because I was very sick. I was near death. I never made it. They found me unconscious in a forest in Germany, with typhoid. But before I ended up in a hospital (I was picked up half-dead in a forest, unconscious), I had been so hungry. I had no food in my stomach for three days and three nights. I suddenly realized in the midst of this hike, that if a small child would walk by me with a piece of bread in its hands, I would steal that piece of bread from that child’s hand.
This was like an illumination in my head. I said, ‘Now I know what she means, there is a Hitler in all of us.’ Depending on the circumstances, you can do horrible things, which you would never even consider when you have a full belly.18
What an amazing conclusion Kubler-Ross made as she drew a direct correlation between her near-death experience and that of the Jewish woman she had just met at the concentration camp. Two entirely different life and death experiences initially led both women to believe they could be as horrendous as Hitler, to the point that Kubler-Ross believed she, too, could kill in order to survive. Believing that one could kill in order to survive is a powerful feeling and one not often thought of, or acted on, by a woman. But what about the basic needs for survival? Does a killing response exist as equally in women as it does in men? If so, could its response equate to an act of aggression against innocent victims?
In Dave Grossman’s book, On Killing, he describes what he calls “The Killing Response Stages.” These stages consist of:
• Concern about being able to kill
• Killing circumstance
• Exhilaration from kill
• Remorse and nausea from kill
• The rationalization and acceptance process
The application of these stages by Grossman was toward individuals in combat, and he clearly indicates that “some individuals may skip certain stages, or blend them, or pass through them so fleetingly they do not even acknowledge their presence.”19 Having served in the first Gulf War and the War on Terror, I concur with Grossman’s stages and feel they extend beyond the deadly situations of combat and into rural America. Also, notice that these stages do not mention specific gender relationships and emotional impacts. In other words, they do not single out males as the only ones who experience these feelings while killing.
Women are fully capable, mentally and physically, of killing both in combat and in everyday survival in society. While all of the previously mentioned stages of killing response do not translate outside of combat, some are definitely applicable to a less life-threatening environment. It is “the rationalization and acceptance process” that has the greatest impact on the topic of women and killing. Is the rationalization and acceptance process different in a woman? What could trigger a woman to kill?
Generally, you do not pick up the daily paper and read about or hear reports on the evening news about how a female has committed yet another murder. It is an anomaly of sorts. And when we do hear of a homicide involving a female subject, the circumstances are usually limited to those of self-defense or emotional trauma. In both situations, they are still culpable for their actions, but the reasoning behind their killing response appears personal in nature. They have become killers due in part to their cultural surroundings, or situations that forced them to react in a violent manner.
A common disorder among women is battered wife syndrome. What keeps a woman living in an environment with a man who continually inflicts both emotional and physical harm upon her ? One consideration is that she feels at fault for the abuse. Another is that she believes she needs her husband for financial support (e.g., housing, food, clothing, etc.). It has also been noted that battered wives stay in a dangerous environment to maintain a stable family environment for their children. In an interesting article, Ann Veilleux, a prestigious counselor and psychotherapist, relates the inner workings of a cult to the reasoning for staying in an abusive relationship. She states:
Another way to understand this phenomenon is to consider a common brainwashing technique used by cults to take away normal, independent volition. In this system, a person is treated with alternately positive and then negative regard and behavior for no reliably ascertainable reason. People treated this way fall into pleasing behavior, trying to get the positive response.20
She also concludes that “[w]omen who stay with abusive partners very often have had abusive parents. To them it’s normal to get hurt by the people you love. Their self esteem is very low from childhood mistreatment and is further undermined by violence from their partners.”21 But what happens when a woman decides she has had enough? What happens when they become more cognizant of their unhealthy surroundings and begin to turn that fear into anger or rage? The end state could become much more violent, if not deadly, for their husbands and possibly other loved ones in direct contact during that emotional and violent release. It’s at this point when a woman potentially becomes a killer. Not necessarily a serial killer comparable to the likes of Belle Gunness or Aileen Wuornos, but a killer nonetheless. Of particular interest to this thought are modern-day American female terrorists Colleen “Jihad Jane” LaRose and Jamie Paulin-Ramirez.
According to CNN, Colleen LaRose was “indicted for conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and kill a person in a foreign country.”22 The report continues to state that she “recruited men on the Internet to wage violent jihad in South Asia and Europe and recruited women on the Internet who had passports and the ability to travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad.”23 A critical look into her thought processes can be found in her YouTube video, where she claims she is “desperate to do something somehow to help” Muslims. Jihad Jane has become the first 21st century American female identified as having direct ties and active affiliations with an Islamic terrorist organization.
Shortly after the announcement of LaRose’s indictment, Jamie Paulin-Ramirez of Colorado was arrested in Ireland for allegedly plotting to kill Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks, for depicting Islamic prophet Mohammed with a dog’s body in July 2007. Within three months of the publishing of these controversial cartoons, the Associated Press provided details into the Abu Omar al-Baghdadi statement calling for the death of Lars Vilks. Al-Baghdadi, a leader in the al-Qaeda organization located in Iraq, called for the “assassination of cartoonist Lars Vilks who dared insult our Prophet, peace be upon him, and we announce a reward during this generous month of Ramadan of $100,000 for the one who kills this criminal.”24 A New York Daily News report stated that Paulin-Ramirez began her transition from American mother and housewife to Islamic terrorist after she married “a Muslim and began covering up her hair and face and with a scarf, leaving only a narrow slit for her eyes.”25
Our society thrives off of the headlines and talking heads on the news, another extremely powerful influence on psychosocial dynamics. Not just any news, but that which speaks of death, blood, and other horrible acts against others. It will take only one such killing spree by a female attacker to set the wheels into motion for future attacks by other female aggressors. This conclusion can be drawn from both a gender-related killing and/or a religiously motivated incident. Females within our society, while not as likely to carry out such vicious attacks, are definitely capable of doing so, and a failure to recognize this will result in many deaths.
Conclusion
As a well-known military journalist and retired lieutenant colonel of the US Army, David Hackworth, has accurately stated that “it’s human nature to start taking things for granted again when danger isn’t banging loudly on the door.” Thus, as we look toward the future, it is likely that an attack that causes mass casualties will be executed by the hand of an American female; it will be an atypical scenario involving a homicide bomber. The deadly acts of killing portrayed by Belle Gunness and Aileen Wuornos certainly prove a dangerous concern to our society but will pale in comparison to future female mass killers. Whether motivated by anger, revenge, religion, or mental disorder, female terror will become more prevalent over time.
Another critical emotional factor to consider is what Grossman labels as “denial defense mechanisms.”26 He explains this theory as “unconscious methods for dealing with traumatic experiences.”27 As previously discussed, traumatic experiences are clear triggering mechanisms for female attacks and cannot be discounted as a cultural concern when contemplating the potential for future female assaults resulting in mass killings.
No place will be immune to these attacks. Schools, churches, shopping malls, and other heavily populated public places will fall victim to a female attacker just as they have previously to male attackers. A question to ponder at this point is, “What will trigger these deadly emotional outbursts? And more importantly, how can we identify and prevent these triggering mechanisms before they overwhelm a particular individual?” As a society, we have not been necessarily concerned with a female aggressor taking up arms and demonstrating a high level of aggression outside of family disputes. We are always leery of the occasional self-defense reaction that causes a wife or girlfriend to kill their significant other, but nothing that results in a deadly assault of significant magnitude.
Women have always played a role in local militias and other domestic terrorist organizations like the Animal Liberation Front, the Earth Liberation Front, and even the Ku Klux Klan, but they were low-impact and supportive roles up to this point. Much like the evolutionary use of Muslim women by various Islamic terrorist organizations, American women will eventually take on greater responsibilities and commitments of terrorist organizations. They will prove themselves as critical factors in the outcome of future attacks against society. Now is the time to take notice and begin acceptance of this potentially deadly outcome and find ways to mitigate these possibilities immediately. No one particular person is immune to becoming a vehicle for extreme violence, and failure to identify this will inevitably lead to another societal threat against which we are not ready to defend.
Until the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, most Americans failed to take notice of the potential threat of terrorists successfully carrying out their jihad within the United States, even though it had already happened twice prior to that fateful day. Additionally, we have experienced multiple attacks inside churches, shopping centers, and in particular, schools and universities. What will it take before we accept the fact that women are fully capable of carrying out these same homicidal acts? While it has been declared that “all men are created equal”28 in our society, I suggest women are just as equal; maybe more so, especially when it comes to having the ability to kill another human being.
Portions of this article were taken from Hughbank’s latest book The Dynamics of Terror and Creation of Homegrown Terrorists, being released this summer by Tate Publishing Company.
Hughbank will present “Women and Terrorism in Our Culture: Is It Possible?” on Friday, September 24th at the ABCHS National Conference in Orlando, Florida.
References
1. Jihad is a “holy war.” Or, more precisely: It means the legal, compulsory, communal effort to expand the territories ruled by Muslims at the expense of territories ruled by non-Muslims. The purpose of jihad, in other words, is not directly to spread the Islamic faith but to extend sovereign Muslim power (faith, of course, often follows the flag). Jihad is thus unabashedly offensive in nature, with the eventual goal of achieving Muslim dominion over the entire globe. See Daniel Pipes, “What is Jihad?”, Washington Post, December 31, 2002. Retrieved from http://www.danielpipes.org/article/990.
2. Holy warrior. One who engages in jihad. Warrior of God.
3 The Islamic form of government representing the political unity and leadership of the Muslim world.
4 A Sunni Islamic school of thought. The principal tenet of Salafism is that Islam was perfect and complete during the days of Muhammad and his companions. Salafism seeks to revive a practice of Islam that more closely resembles the religion during the time of Muhammad.
5 Laurie Pawlik-Kienlen, “Why Female Serial Killers Kill: Why Murderesses Go Undetected Longer Than Murderers,” PsychologySuite101.com, February 26, 2007. Retrieved from http://psychology.suite101.com/article.cfm/female_serial_killers.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Asymmetric warfare deals with unknowns, with surprise in terms of ends, ways, and means. The more dissimilar the opponents, the more difficult it is to anticipate [their] actions. One way to look at [it] is to see it as a classic action-reaction-counteraction cycle. See Clinton J. Ancker III and Michael D. Burke, “Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare,” Military Review (July–August 2003), p. 18.
10 Farhana Ali, “Muslim Female Fighters: An Emerging Trend,” Terrorism Monitor, Volume III, Issue 21, November 3, 2005, 9.
11 Ibid, 10.
12 Timur Moon, “Leila Khaled — hijacked by destiny,” Al Jazeerah, October 17, 2002. Retrieved from http://one-state.net/khaled.html.
13 Batoul Wehbe, “‘Bride of the South’ Back to the South,” Al-Manar TV, July 25, 2008. Retrieved from http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=51357&language=en.
14 La Porte County Historical Society, “Belle Gunness, La Porte’s ‘Lady Blue-beard’.” Retrieved from http://www.laportecountyhistory.org/belleg1.htm.
15 Aileen Wuornos Biography (1956-2002). Retrieved from http://www.biography.com/search/ article.do?id=11735792.
16 “Maidanek,” Retrieved from http://www.polandjews.com/Maidanek.htm.
17 ‘’On Death and Dying,’’ an interview conducted by Daniel Redwood, D.C., with Elizabeth Kubler-Ross M.D. (1995). Retrieved from http://www.healthy.net/scr/interview.asp?Id=205.
18 Ibid.
19 David A. Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1995), 231-240.
20 Ann Veilleux, MSSW, “Why Women Stay: Understanding The Battered Wife,” (1999). Retrieved from http://harmoniaonline.com/Articles/WhyWomenStay.html.
21 Ibid.
22 “U.S.: Pennsylvania woman tried to recruit terrorists,” (March 10, 2010). Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/03/09/pennsylvania.terror.indictment/index.html?hpt=T2.
23 Ibid.
24 Maggie Michael, “Cartoonist faces al-Qaida bounty,” (September 2007). Retrieved from http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20070916/NEWS/709160374?Title=Cartoonist-faces-al-Qaida-bounty&tc=ar.
25 “Jamie Paulin-Ramirez, busted in Ireland over plot to kill cartoonist, freed,” (March 14, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/03/14/2010-03-14_jamie_paulinramirez_busted_in_ireland_over_plot_to_kill_cartoonist_freed_.html.
26 David A. Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1995), 255.
27 Ibid.
28 Drafted into the Declaration of Independence by Thomas Jefferson.
by Richard Hughbank, CHS-V
Since the United States was personally affected by terrorism in 2001, we have been constantly inundated with all of the latest headlines of terrorist attacks from around the world. On rare occasions, Dr. Ayman Zawahiri, Usama bin Laden’s second-in-command and al-Qaeda’s apparent spokesperson, appears on videos to discuss how their jihad1 continues to grow in strength as it gains momentum and the mujahidin2 continue to plan and carry out their terrorist attacks at a global level. This international threat has created intense concern for governments and citizens alike. But who is it that we really fear? Most would say it is those who actually carry out the terroristic acts—stereotypically, Muslim males whom many perceive as crazy, irrational individuals who have mentally committed themselves to destroying all non-Muslims in their endeavor to create a universal Caliphate.3 However, I believe this is an extremely dangerous misconception.
Most mujahidin are, in fact, extremely rational actors in what they accept as a just cause in the name of Allah. Additionally, the traditional use of a Muslim male martyr is changing; females are slowly populating terrorist organizations as willing participants in the global jihad. The versatile weapon of Islamic terrorist organizations, the human martyr, has no boundaries and is motivated by fanatical prejudices. Viewed in the Muslim culture as having minimal social status—or as an expendable asset—women are now recruited and used to carry out homicide bombing attacks. The once inferior sex has joined forces with its male counterparts, offering an element of surprise to their already powerful arsenal in the global Salafist4 jihad movement.
Why use women to carry out a man’s “natural born” right to fight and die for his family’s honor? There are several explanations to this current trend of female homicide bomber attacks. Among those potential reasons are the following:
• Females create a greater element of surprise to their potential victims.
• Attacks carried out by females receive greater media coverage.
• Women create a force multiplier for organizations.
• Females tend to draw less attention from the general public, thereby making freedom of movement easier.
In light of these reasons, one must ask why women would want to participate in jihad, given their low societal status. From a personal perspective, joining the jihad provides an unparalleled opportunity for them to become an equal in an otherwise male-dominated culture. Maybe they have shamed their family in some way (e.g., became pregnant out of wedlock or were raped) and are attempting to regain their family’s honor through martyrdom. Some have speculated that these women act out of revenge, because they have lost a loved one either in the war against non-Muslims, from a religious sense, or from nationalistic fervor.
Thoughts on Female Terrorism
As a society, we have come to expect, and almost accept, deadly actions by male aggressors such as David Berkowitz (Son of Sam), Ted Bundy, and Jeffrey Dahmer, but what about their female counterparts? I posit that historical American female attackers such as Belle Gunness and Aileen Wuornos, who are discussed in greater detail later in this article, committed acts of terror for reasons other than those of their male counterparts previously mentioned, as well as those of their female Muslim counterparts.
Laurie Pawlik-Kienlen, editor for PsychologySuite101.com, stated:
Female serial killers are more likely to get away with murder than male serial killers are. Murderesses can kill for years without getting caught because they’re driven by different motivations; murderers tend to get caught before too much time has passed. Female killers have different psychological disorders, which may affect their motivation and modus operandi. Their motives also explain why female serial killers kill—and why they don’t get caught right away.5
Pawlik-Kienlen goes on to point out that “forensic psychologists debate the term ‘female serial killer’ because murderesses don’t kill for the same reasons as murderers. The psychological disorders are different.”6 I believe it is the “psychological disorders” that lead females to act out against others in the same manner Muslim female terrorists serve as homicide bombers. As noted above, males have carried out multiple acts of terror involving the mass deaths of random people. This poses a necessary question: “Why?”
The historical significant char-acteristical differences between male and female serial killers follow:
• Female serial killers have long killing sprees, lasting up to eight years, while those of males seldom last longer than four years and usually end after several months.
• Female serial killers kill more quietly and “less violently,” using poison or other less detectable methods such as suffocation. Males tend to batter, strangle, stab, and shoot.
• Female serial killers kill for profit most of the time, while male serial killers kill for sexual reasons about half the time.
• Female serial killers generally kill people close to them, such as husbands, family members, or people dependent on them. Males more frequently kill strangers.
However, there are three similarities between male and female serial killers:
• They look, act, and sound normal, which makes people trust them.
• They are sociopaths, but not insane.
• Neither male nor female serial killers have a conscience.7
To add further potential concern for future domestic female terrorism to occur in the United States, I conclude with one more important comment from Pawlik-Kienlen:
Female serial killers are divided into nine categories: black widows, angels of death, sexual predators, revenge killers, profit killers, team killers, killers of questionable sanity, killers whose motives defy explanation, and unsolved crimes.8
Motivations are the pure essence of killers and the categorical explanations offered by Pawlik-Kienlen provide offer a chilling insight into a female’s drive to kill. This drive will eventually lead to a new pattern of terror that everyone must consider and prepare for accordingly in the near future.
Historical Perspectives
It is a woman who teaches you today a lesson in heroism, who teaches you the meaning of Jihad, and the way to die a martyr’s death…It is a woman who has shocked the enemy with her thin, meagre, and weak body...It is a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded all the myths about women’s weakness, submissiveness, and enslavement.
—“It’s a Woman!” Editorial, Al-Sha’ab, February 1, 2002
International Female Terrorism
The use of females as combatives, or homicide bombers, against non-Muslims has become less of an anomaly over the past decade and is a tactic definitely worth discussing when attempting to understand modern, asymmetric9 terrorism in the 21st century. As we look back in history, Muslim culture has not widely accepted females as active participants in jihad. Their primary roles were limited to that of wives and mothers. Additionally, women have been, and still are, perceived as lesser beings. They had their place in the family structure and it did not include leaving the house, actively fighting in jihad, or assisting in the creation of a new Caliphate.
Employing female terrorists in a male-dominated jihad was a bold move by al-Qaeda at both the strategic and tactical levels in their global movement. Farhana Ali, RAND Corporation Associate International Policy Analyst, explains:
Muslim women are increasingly joining the global jihad, some motivated by religious conviction to change the plight of Muslims under occupation, and recruited by al-Qaeda and local terrorist groups strained by increased arrests and deaths of male operatives. Attacks by female fighters, also known as the mujahidaat, are arguably more deadly than those conducted by male jihadists, attributed in part to the perception that women are unlikely to commit such acts of horror, and when they do, the shock or “CNN factor” of their attacks draws far greater media attention than male bombers. Increasing awareness with instant media attention can motivate other women to commit similar attacks.10
Ali clearly identifies several critical tactical factors in the use of female homicide bombers as martyrs in traditional terrorist attacks. These are extremely valid and logical arguments and should prove disconcerting to all potential victims. Ali goes on to point out that “the involvement of the early Arab women in jihad is celebrated today throughout the Muslim world, and they serve as icons and a precedent for contemporary Muslim women who choose suicide operations.”11
Leila Khaled
A Palestinian icon and member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Leila Khaled served as the poster child for female terrorists back in the 1970s after hijacking TWA flight 840 on August 29, 1969. At the young age of 25, Khaled had become the first woman to ever hijack an airplane. A year later on September 6, 1970, Khaled attempted to hijack another plane, El Al flight 219, as part of the PFLP Dawson’s Field Hijackings. Her partner was shot four times and killed by an Israeli air marshal and she was physically restrained and handed over to law enforcement authorities in London, where she would later be released on October 1 as part of an exchange for other hostages. Khaled believed her actions were just because she acted on what she called “moral values” during an armed struggle. In an article written by Timur Moon of Al Jazeerah, Khaled was quoted as saying:
We hijacked planes because the whole world was deaf when we were screaming from our tents, and nobody heard our suffering. Until the beginning of the revolution in 1967, Palestinians were only dealt with as people needing humanitarian aid, not as people with a cause. We had to use tactics to attract international attention.12
Khaled’s words provide insight into her personal need to protect her people and nation. Thus, her terroristic acts were motivated by a perceived fear of genocide and a fear of extinction. Undoubtedly, these fears were extremely real in her mind, but did they justify her actions?
Sana’a Mehaidli
Another chronicled example of a female committing a terroristic act is that of Sana’a Mehaidli on April 9, 1985. Known as the first Arab-Lebanese and youngest female homicide bomber to date, Mehaidli, at the age of 16, used her car as a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing two Israeli officers and wounding two other soldiers. As a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the “Bride of the South” was carrying 200 kilograms of trinitrotoluene (TNT or dynamite) explosives next to an Israeli convoy in Jezzin, South Lebanon,13 when she acted out against an opposition she felt was terrorizing her own people.
Like Khaled, Mehaidli violently attacked a specific group of individuals with a premeditated plan. The 16-year-old Mehaidli was convinced she played a critical role in a cause greater than herself. But how? What motivated Mehaidli to become a martyr, especially at such a young age? Any reasoning on our part is pure speculation at this point. Could it have been driven by a sense of patriotism, or was she religiously motivated? Possibly, she was influenced by the loss of a loved one in the war against Israel. Regardless of the reason, this incident serves as another eye-opening example of a female who was willing to perpetrate a terroristic and heinous act against others through nontraditional means.
Domestic Female Acts of Terror
Thus far, I have offered two examples of females committing terroristic acts. As you may have noticed, both martyrs were young in age and belonged to known terrorist organizations and were Muslims with strong Islamic beliefs. The examples that follow are about American women who were captured and found guilty of acts of terror against our society. As you will come to understand, their collective end states were quite the same—multiple deaths; however, their reasoning was equally different in comparison. Furthermore, their actions resulted in only one or two deaths at a time (better known as serial killers) rather than killing multiple innocent victims simultaneously (more commonly recognized as mass killers).
Belle Gunness
In the first case study, we will examine Belle Gunness. Gunness, an immigrant of Norway, was born in 1858 and came to the United States in 1886. Also known as “Lady Bluebeard,” Gunness was a serial killer and black widow. Having collected $8,000 in life insurance monies after her first husband’s natural death, Gunness married a second time to Peter Gunness. Peter mysteriously died from a head injury and Belle collected from yet another life insurance policy. Following her second husband’s death, Belle advertised in Norwegian-language newspapers as a widow looking for another husband. After several gentlemen callers answered the advertisement and met with Belle at her farm in Indiana, one particular person, Andrew Helgelein, sold all his worldly belongings and moved in with Belle; he would be her last husband. Belle killed all who responded to her newspaper ad and showed up on her doorstep. On April 28, 1908, Belle Gunness’ farmhouse burned down and during the fire investigation, a shallow grave was found in her yard. The grave contained the body of Andrew Helgelein. Additionally, 12 more bodies were discovered, and it is estimated that Belle killed and buried some 40 other men.14
Belle Gunness is a classic case of “wife kills husband then collects his life insurance policy.” This particular crime, when repeated time and time again by a female, pertains to Pawlik-Kienlen’s classification of a “black widow.” She was an anomaly. Belle Gunness was a female serial killer. As a female, Belle broke the cultural perception of what defines a serial killer. She exhibited a personality unlike anything seen before in a woman. Her acts of terror broke a mold and opened the door for multiple psychological and sociological studies for decades to follow.
Aileen Wuornos
Born in February 1956, Aileen Carol Wuornos had a difficult childhood. Her father was a child molester and sociopath and died after hanging himself in prison, and her mother abandoned her and her brother in 1960. Aileen became pregnant at the age of 14, claiming her brother was the father. After giving the baby up for adoption, she left home to hitchhike across the country, and worked as a prostitute to earn income. During her travels, Aileen met a waitress, Tyria Moore, and fell in love. After struggling with their finances, Aileen and Tyria decided that Aileen should start robbing her johns and then kill them. Over an 11-month period between 1989 and 1990, police discovered seven dead men shot by the same gun. The police arrested both women in January 1991 after receiving several phone calls identifying them as subjects in the murders. Aileen went to trial and was sentenced to death after confessing to six of the murders. She was executed by lethal injection on October 9, 2002.15
Here we have a modern case of a female serial killer. While the obvious reason for her killing spree was money, Aileen’s childhood clearly established an unstable foundation and one that lacked a sense of moral responsibility or social conscience, which provided a transparent motivation for her sociopathic future of violence. Having lost her father to suicide in prison and seeing her mother abandon her at the age of 4, Aileen was placed in a traumatic situation at a very young age. To aggravate the complexity of her dysfunctional family, Aileen’s father was a child molester. It is uncertain, through my research, whether both Aileen and her brother were victims of their father, but that would lend further explanation to the psychological problems she displayed as an adult.
Through these four case studies, we have identified both foreign and domestic female killers. The takeaway from these four women lies in both their potential and rationale for killing several people, all of whom were men. The two Muslim women killed for religious-political reasons and one could even argue their actions were motivated by revenge or desperation. Additionally, both used their own bodies as vehicles of destruction, killing themselves during their homicide bombings. They committed terroristic acts of violence in the name of Allah to further the goal of creating a universal Caliphate. On the other hand, the two female serial killers located in the United States killed for entirely different reasons. Both Belle and Aileen killed for monetary gains, which provided a means of survival in their minds. They were acting out of personal motivation and killed several men over a period of time, and neither was willing to sacrifice her own life for a greater cause. These particular examples do not, in and of themselves, preclude the potential for a female homicide bomber here in the United States. Quite the contrary. To date, historically identified motivators for female killers have included “revenge,” which is one of the templated patterns of incitement for Muslim women due to the loss of their fathers, brothers, and husbands in jihad.
This article addresses the difference between typical homicides and atypical homicides. Homicide investigators, even those in large agencies that handle dozens of homicides each year, spend the majority of their careers investigating typical homicides. These include homicides where the perpetrator has a relationship with the victim; the victim is engaged in drug activity; or the victim is a target, bystander, or participant in another illegal activity. Atypical homicides are those that do not fall into one of these areas; they include serial crimes. This article addresses how the recognition of these two types of homicide, as well as how investigative differences between the two, can assist the cold case profiler and what profilers need for a cold case profiling.
Searching for and detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and similar hazards has become increasingly important in law enforcement and military applications. Training for IED detection can be significantly enhanced through the use of cognitively based training to augment field training methods. The present research addressed cognitive issues in IED detection and training. Five major types of errors in search and detection were identified and characterized. A cognitively based training program was developed and provided to eliminate these errors. Two experiments were conducted. The results demonstrated that this training, termed the “SMOKE” system (after the acronym for the five error types—errors of Search, Movement, Observation, failures to Keep Searching, and errors of Evaluation), significantly improved IED search and detection. Trainees were substantially more successful in detecting a spectrum of mock hazardous devices, were faster at detecting less well hidden hazards, and were less prone to specific error types than were respondents in control comparison groups. These findings demonstrated the utility of cognitively based IED search training, to be conducted in tandem with comprehensive field training methods for the development of effective IED search and detection skills.
Abstract
Searching for and detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and similar hazards has become increasingly important in law enforcement and military applications. Training for IED detection can be significantly enhanced through the use of cognitively based training to augment field training methods. The present research addressed cognitive issues in IED detection and training. Five major types of errors in search and detection were identified and characterized. A cognitively based training program was developed and provided to eliminate these errors. Two experiments were conducted. The results demonstrated that this training, termed the “SMOKE” system (after the acronym for the five error types—errors of Search, Movement, Observation, failures to Keep Searching, and errors of Evaluation), significantly improved IED search and detection. Trainees were substantially more successful in detecting a spectrum of mock hazardous devices, were faster at detecting less well hidden hazards, and were less prone to specific error types than were respondents in control comparison groups. These findings demonstrated the utility of cognitively based IED search training, to be conducted in tandem with comprehensive field training methods for the development of effective IED search and detection skills.
Introduction
The detection and neutralization of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has become increasingly important to American and allied forces in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan conflicts. IEDs have similarly become more important to domestic law enforcement at all levels and are expected to have ongoing and increased importance in the future (e.g., Cameron, 2008). This is certainly the case for police and sheriff’s departments. Others involved in such work include the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and additional agencies concerned with Homeland Security. Such search and detection activities may also ultimately involve civilians, such as security guards or volunteers in police auxiliary programs.
It is critically important to improve current training methods for IED search and detection. Presently, such methods may involve training in the recognition of various types of explosive devices, and field evolutions in which trainees are exposed to practice environments containing mock IEDs. These types of training are laudable and important in the development of hazard detection skills. However, they generally lack important cognitive components. Specifically, these are prior frameworks for search methods; explicit connections between the skills employed and their rationales; and the use of specific, feature-intensive training to form smooth coordinated search methods in the field (Sharps, 2010; also see Bransford and Johnson 1972, 1973; Haviland & Clark, 1974).
Recent research in our laboratory is concerned with eyewitness memory for weapons, vehicles, people, and crime-scene features and has demonstrated a number of principles important for visual search in relevant environments (e.g., Sharps, Barber, Stahl, & Villegas, 2003; Villegas, Sharps, Satterthwaite, & Chisholm, 2005; Sharps, Hess, Casner, Ranes, & Jones, 2007; Sharps & Hess, 2008; Sharps, Janigian, Hess, & Hayward, 2009). In these studies, many respondents looked directly at an explicit source of hazard, such as a hand grenade, or at an implicit (potential) source of hazard, such as a military ammunition box situated among street clutter—without noticing the hazard (Hess & Sharps, 2006, April; Sharps et al, 2007). These considerations informed the development of the present research, which was concerned specifically with the improvement of IED search and detection in realistic contexts.
The present article reports the development of a cognitively based training program for IED detection, to be used in tandem with current field-based methods. This program presents specific techniques for the provision of the front-loaded, explicit, feature-intensive skills essential for successful IED search and detection (the term “front-loaded” is frequently applied in law enforcement to specific training which is provided prior to training exercises, or to field experience, as opposed to training which is acquired during the process of training exercises themselves). Additionally, this research enabled us to explore and identify the major types of errors typically made in IED search activities and to provide specific training to defeat these errors.
Initial Considerations
A successful IED search requires specific perceptual and cognitive activities that do not come to one naturally. There is a tendency to focus on the core of any given situation, rather than on peripheral considerations; this tendency reaches its height in the “tunnel vision” (e.g., Grossman & Christensen, 2004) characteristic of the stressful or violent environments which may contain IEDs. At its most intense, this “core” focus of attention may be an armed assailant, who may be operating in an IED-rich environment. Any such assailant must, of course, be the center of focus for responding law enforcement officers. The immediate threat must typically be eliminated first. However, if that assailant has prepared his or her position with explosive devices on the periphery of the action, the IEDs may go unobserved, as occurred in our previous empirical work (Hess & Sharps, 2006, April; Sharps et al., 2007). The potential consequences of this phenomenon in the field are obvious.
This effect may readily be observed in training situations, as well as in the laboratory. In realistic field training evolutions, it is not uncommon to observe even seasoned officers so focused on a potential assailant, or on a developing violent situation, that they completely ignore mock IEDs. This will frequently be observed even when those IEDs are placed in plain sight.
The core of a given environment may not be something as drastically attention-grabbing as an armed assailant or a firefight. The core for a person hustling through an airport may be internal, such as the individual’s thoughts about making the flight on schedule, or external yet irrelevant, such as the recalcitrant luggage with which the person is coping at the time. The core for any of us on the street may be another person with whom we are speaking, or a visually compelling but innocuous display such as a flashy advertisement or a group of people behaving atypically on the sidewalk. Anything which grabs our attention—and our central perceptual and processing capacities—may be the core that distracts us from the peripheral search necessary for successful hazard detection.
Additionally, IEDs may be disguised, or they may be placed or constructed in such a way that they present an innocuous or ambiguous visual picture to the observer. In other words, an IED may present itself in such a way that the major clue to its existence is its inappropriateness to the local environment. This may be true of the length of pipe that should not be where it is, the metal container which becomes invisible among other clutter but is definitely out of place, or of a host of other disguises for hidden sources of hazard. This problem assumes special significance when a disguised or innocuous object is placed on the periphery of a given action. Even when such an object is directly observed, it may be completely misinterpreted.
Such errors of observation, even regarding important objects such as identifiable weapons, can be quite outlandish. In a recent study (Sharps & Hess, 2008; also see Force Science News, 2009), we provided civilian respondents with a street scene depicting a potentially violent situation, in which a man or woman was seen aiming a handgun at a female “victim.” This situation, according to the police experts we consulted, absolutely required a shooting response on the part of any officer encountering it in the field. Our civilian respondents agreed—88% indicated that they would fire on the assailant. However, in another condition, we armed our “assailant” with a harmless power screwdriver which he might simply have been holding or with which he might have been gesturing in a non-violent argument with the “victim.” Eighty-five percent of our respondents indicated their decision to kill him, too; the difference was not significant. In other words, our respondents could not tell a power tool from a Beretta. They fired on people holding either object indiscriminately, based on expectation. Incidentally, although our respondents proved equally likely to kill the criminal perpetrator and the unarmed workman, only 11% thought a law enforcement officer was justified in doing so to either individual under any circumstances. This finding may prove to be of substantial importance in the trial of officer-involved shootings before juries.
In short, people frequently mistake an object for something else based on their expectations of what should be there. Such errors occur even with a clearly identifiable object in the hands of a core assailant; and such errors of observation will assume lethal significance if that object is an IED.
When an IED is actually located, it may, unsurprisingly, form the core to which our attention is directed. Once we find a potentially lethal device, we tend to focus our attention on it and we stop searching. This makes perfect sense; unless, of course, there is more than one IED in the environment. It is critically important to continue searching until all potential hazards have been identified, with obvious attention to neutralizing the hazard already observed. It’s crucially important to keep searching.
Finally, when an individual observes an object that may be an IED, it is important to evaluate it properly. The errors which may be produced in evaluation take two forms. Either the object may be dismissed as innocuous, or it may be incorrectly identified as an IED. This type of error is therefore not as simple as those previously considered. Although the identification of an innocuous object as an IED may be expensive in terms of police resources, the identification of the IED as an innocuous object is likely to kill people. Therefore, it is important that training evolutions in this area do not reduce the tendency of trainees to identify plausible objects as IEDs. To decide that every given object which happens to be in the wrong place at the wrong time is an IED is nonsensical. However, to decide that a given ambiguous object might be an explosive device, especially when it is observed in a potentially IED-rich environment, may be the key to survival.
In view of all of these initial considerations, we developed an experimental training program to address each of the major factors discussed. The focus of this program was to provide front-loaded, explicit, feature-intensive training which would improve the probability and effectiveness of IED search and detection in a realistic field environment.
Experiment 1
The intent of Experiment 1 was to provide and evaluate training with the following goals:
To expand searches to the periphery of a given scene.
To enable trainees to make better observations of a variety of IED types, of different levels of visual salience, in different central and peripheral locations.
To enable trainees to evaluate the prospect that an object might be an IED based on the relative probability of that type of object’s presence in the given scene.
This training was to be front-loaded and explicit. It was intended to form a prior framework for understanding. Finally, it was to be based in feature-intensive understanding of both the training protocol and of the types of scenes to which it was to be applied.
This first experiment was a preliminary pilot study designed to determine the degree to which this type of training might result in better IED search and detection. The techniques employed for both training and assessment were based on consultation with law enforcement experts and on observation of police and SWAT training.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four college-aged participants (reported age mean 25.5 years, SD 4.47 years) were recruited for course credit from University psychology classes. Twenty-one women and three men participated, reflecting the makeup of the classes. Twelve respondents participated in a training group and the other twelve in a control group that received no training. These participants were of similar age to law enforcement cadets; additional research is needed to ascertain the degree to which the observed effects generalize to older or more experienced populations.
Materials. A PowerPoint presentation was prepared, composed of thirty-two slides (the total number of slides was actually fifty-six, including blank grey slides used to separate the slides with training content). Each content slide depicted a potentially violent street situation that took place in a gravel driveway with garbage cans and street clutter. In each scene, a male or female assailant aimed a handgun at a female victim. This type of scene has been extensively used in our earlier work on memory, cognition, and eyewitness identification (e.g., Sharps, Hess, Casner, Ranes, & Jones, 2007; Sharps & Hess, 2008; Sharps, Janigian, Hess, & Hayward, 2009; also see Sharps, 2010). In the present study, however, the scenes were augmented by the presence of mock IEDs. The scenes varied in terms of the size and color of the IEDs (and hence, the visual salience of the given devices); the placement of those IEDs at different peripheral and central locations; and the degree to which a potential IED was disguised or not (e.g., an unadorned grenade versus a new backpack which, while placed in an odd location, did not give other visual evidence of being an IED). Finally, three of the scenes incorporated multiple IEDs to demonstrate the need to keep searching in a given environment even after an initial IED is detected and identified.
The types of IEDs employed included a grenade, a single-pipe bomb, a gasoline can rigged with a mock detonator, military ammo cans, a battered briefcase, and a new backpack. Both male and female “assailants” were employed because subjects in previous experiments on eyewitness identification (e.g., Sharps et al., 2007, 2009) have evinced surprise at seeing a female assailant.
During the initial phases of this study, a law enforcement expert suggested that the use of an armed assailant in the training materials might prove problematic for law enforcement trainees. Their training hones their responsiveness to a given armed perpetrator, and this trained allocation of core attentional assets to the assailant might reduce the ability of law enforcement personnel to benefit from training in the peripheral observation skills needed for successful IED search and detection. A contrasting view was suggested by a reviewer of an earlier version of this article, who proposed that although an armed assailant would divert attention from a given response to an IED, the combined threat would place a priority on faster response; thus, according to this hypothesis, the benefit of the SMOKE system should operate similarly across armed and unarmed assailant conditions.
Further experiments are needed to address these specific issues. However, although the experiments reported here were concerned with civilian trainees rather than with law enforcement personnel, the prospect of distracting weapon focus was noted (e.g., Steblay, 1992) even for this population, so an additional set of slides was created for increased relatability to law enforcement training. In these slides, the assailant stood in a threatening posture but was unarmed. Otherwise, these “unarmed” materials were identical to the materials in which the assailant was armed.
Procedures. The materials were presented to members of the training group along with an accompanying script read by a male experimenter. This script first introduced the importance of IED issues. Then, as each slide was presented, the lesson of that particular slide was explicitly discussed. These lessons included the following:
The fact that IEDs may be obvious or difficult to see, either because they are hidden or because they form good contours with their immediate environment.
The need to search peripheral as well as central locations in any given scene.
The need to conduct and continue such search even if surprised by a factor such as a female assailant.
The need to continue search even after a given IED is discovered.
Again, this initial series of slides was created as preliminary pilot effort rather than as a finished product. The goal of Experiment 1 was to gauge the degree to which front-loaded, explicit, feature-intensive instruction of this type would enhance respondents abilities to search for and detect IEDs. The control group, in contrast, was given only the initial information on the importance of IED issues.
To evaluate the results of this training, a field search situation was created in a moderately cluttered, 8x12-foot laboratory room. This room contained a large rolling tool chest; several computers and a printer; some electronic instrumentation; and a scattering of books, papers, and notebooks across a counter and two desks. A mock IED was placed between two computer monitors in plain sight on one of the counters. This IED was a pipe bomb, composed of three plain metal pipes bundled together with a timer, power pack, and appropriate wiring. The device was approximately 14 inches long and 5 inches in diameter.
Participants in both the control and training conditions were told to enter the room and search for hazardous devices. On seeing such a device, if any, they were told to point directly at it and say “bomb.” Their responses were clocked on a Lafayette Instruments precision timer.
Results and Discussion
Weapons, gender, and the potential importance of individual differences. For these civilian respondents, there was no difference in performance between the “gun” and “no gun” conditions. Law enforcement participants, of course, might very well exhibit the effects anticipated for the “gun” condition. This prospect prompted the creation of new elements in the protocol for Experiment 2, reported below.
Men’s performance (mean detection time 12.47 seconds, SD = 9.23 seconds), was, on average, 33.8% better than that of women (mean detection time 18.85 seconds, SD = 16.01 seconds). The large gender disparity in this sample precluded formal analysis, but the standard deviations were obviously relatively large; the gender difference, when subjected to an exploratory uneven-N’s analysis of variance, was not significant. Therefore, it was impossible to say anything substantive about male and female performance in this experiment. However, the relatively large standard deviations suggested that individual differences for both sexes might prove to be important for the benefit to be realized for this training. Therefore, individual differences were addressed in Experiment 2 below.
Identified Error Types. Respondents in this study were observed during the field search evolution in which they searched a room containing a mock IED. The errors they made were classified into five types:
Errors of SEARCH. For this error type, respondents focused on only one part of the room, or on only one plane, failing to look up or down. An interesting finding was that some respondents focused on only one side of the room and failed to notice anything on the other side. In short, respondents frequently took part of the room as their core search area and failed to examine items on the periphery of the given area.
Errors of MOVEMENT. There was a tendency on the part of some subjects to remain in one place in the room, frequently at the door. From such a perspective, many areas of the room—behind objects and under tables—were completely invisible to them. There was frequently no tendency to move about the room in an effort to take different necessary visual perspectives.
Errors of OBSERVATION. In these errors, respondents looked directly at the IED but did not report it and moved on to look at other objects. In some cases, the same error was made repeatedly with the IED. Whether these respondents mistook the IED for something else, or simply did not see it, is unknown at this time. However, just as a person can look at a power screwdriver and see a handgun, respondents who made these errors looked at a large, silvery pipe bomb with a timer and a battery pack and saw nothing dangerous.
Failures to KEEP SEARCHING. In these instances, respondents decided they had found everything there was to find. An innocuous object would be identified as an IED, and the individual would report to the experimenter that he or she was finished.
Errors of EVALUATION. These occurred when respondents identified innocuous objects as IEDs. Such objects included a briefcase, a laptop computer, an electronic amplifier for physiological experiments (the room used for the field exercise was a laboratory chamber), a small pillow, and a wooden box. Some of these objects were plausible disguises for IEDs. Others were not, ranging from the implausible to the absurd. What is important about these errors, however, is that they occurred with the actual mock IED in plain sight.
All errors observed fell within one of these categories and formed the readily memorable anagram SMOKE. The five letters of this anagram form a group at the lowest identified capacity for “chunks,”organized units of information, for human short-term memory (see Miller, 1956). They also contain only one element more than an optimal “rehearsal group” as identified by Mandler (1967). Thus, this anagram forms an excellent mnemonic device on which a front-loaded framework for training in IED detection may be based.
Effectiveness of Training. The major question for this experiment was the effect of the training. This effect was clear and significant—F (1, 22) = 5.06, p = .035. On average, control respondents required a mean of 24.54 seconds (SD = 5.42 seconds) to detect the device. Training group respondents required only 11.56 seconds (SD = 6.85 seconds), an average improvement of 53%. The standard deviations were large and clearly indicated the importance of individual differences in the ability to benefit from this training. This issue was addressed in Experiment 2.
However, this result represented more than an incremental increase in effectiveness; the average time required to detect the IED was halved by the training employed. The strong utility of this front-loaded, explicit, feature-intensive training for IED detection, even in a population with no prior training or exposure in the area, was clearly demonstrated. Based on this initial result, a revised, modified training method was refined and tested in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Forty-six college-aged participants (reported ages mean 19.44 years, SD = 1.9 years) were recruited for course credit from university psychology classes. Twenty-nine women and seventeen men participated, again reflecting the makeup of these different college courses. As in Experiment 1, these participants were of similar age to law enforcement cadets; additional research is needed to ascertain the degree to which the observed effects generalize to older or more experienced populations.
Twenty-three respondents participated in a training group, and twenty-three in a control group which did not receive the training. These forty-six respondents were culled at random from an initial sample of fifty-five respondents. The reason for this procedure was to provide for equal-N’s analysis. As a precaution, results from the original sample of fifty-five were subjected to unequal-Ns analyses. The effects reported below in the Results section did not differ between the randomly-selected final sample and the unequal N’s of the initial sample.
Materials. A new PowerPoint presentation was prepared, composed of 40 slides. Law enforcement input in the wake of Experiment 1 and the lessons learned from the experiment itself were used to refine this new presentation. The layout of the presentation slides was specifically as follows:
The first slide was blank, during which the importance of IED issues was discussed by an experimenter, so that respondent attention would be directed solely to the content of the experimenter’s introduction.
The second slide summarized the five types of errors identified by SMOKE. This early introduction was used to maximize the primacy effect, the beneficial effect of initial learning (e.g., Crowder, 1976; see also Sharps, Price, & Bence, 1996) on respondent memory for an understanding of the SMOKE errors so they could be avoided.
Slides 3–10 followed. These depicted a scene in which several individuals who may have been the victims of an IED attack were lying on the ground in front of a garage. These slides also depicted IEDs of different levels of salience, either alone or in the presence of a potential assailant. The assailant was armed with a handgun in one slide and unarmed in another; one specific intent of these slides was to give participants initial practice in scanning for IEDs even in the presence of an assailant, armed or unarmed. This is an issue of potentially critical importance for law enforcement trainees, as noted above. The other major intent of these specific slides was to foster the depth of processing (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972; also see Sharps, 2003, 2010) necessary for training in the search and detection of IEDs in complex contexts.
It was felt that dealing with a limited range of IEDs in training might reduce trainees’ ability to recognize other types of IEDs in the field. Therefore, slides 11–18 were used to familiarize participants with a range of different types of IEDs in order to reduce this type of mind-set. It was important for respondents to see these IEDs in a realistic context rather than in isolation; they were therefore depicted as being held or in the act of being deployed by a tactically experienced police officer dressed in typical gang fashion and behaving in a proper field-valid manner. The experimenter’s narrative for these slides encouraged trainees to focus on the IED as well as on the perpetrator and the context and to engage in a feature-intensive analysis of the nature of the given IED observed.
With slides 1–18 providing the necessary cognitive background, slides 19–33 were non-redundant slides that were originally used in Experiment 1. As in the first experiment, these slides gave trainees practice and instruction in detecting IEDs. The IEDs varied in their level of visual salience and disguise. They were placed in different peripheral and central locations, under different conditions of potential surprise, and in different numbers.
Slide 34 reintroduced the SMOKE error classification. This was followed by five slides, one devoted to each error type, in order to facilitate maximum trainee focus on each error type for better learning retention. Finally, the last slide summarized the SMOKE errors together. The purpose of these final slides was to reinforce memorization of the error types at the end of the training session, making use of the recency effect, the well established principle in which learning at the end of a given learning session tends to be the most powerful and retained (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1993). In view of the memorability of the SMOKE acronym, in the terms of short-term memory (Miller, 1956) and rehearsal group (Mandler, 1967) mentioned above, the arrangement of these forty slides was intended to provide the best front-loaded, explicit, feature-intensive cognitively based training available at this time (see Sharps, 2010).
Procedures. As in Experiment 1, this regimen was administered to the “training” group, composed of twenty-three respondents chosen at random. The control group, also composed of twenty-three randomly chosen participants, received only the information about the importance of IED issues prior to entering the test environment.
The procedure and test environment for this experiment, with a single exception, were exactly the same as those of Experiment 1. Digital photographs of the room layout, made before each experimental session, were used to ensure identical contexts among experiments and cells.
The exception was that three devices were used instead of the single-device scenario employed in Experiment 1. That device—a large three-pipe pipe bomb—was used again and in the same relatively visible location in order to constitute the “simple” (easiest to find) device for this experiment.
A smaller single-pipe device was also constructed for this experiment. This IED was placed between a computer and its printer on a desk in an orientation readily visible from the proper angle, but not in plain sight as was the simple device. This partially hidden single-pipe IED was designated the “moderate” (moderately difficult to find) device.
Finally, a darkly colored pineapple grenade shell was fitted with a mock “stick” timer and battery pack. This device was placed in shadow beneath an office chair, beneath and parallel to one of the horizontal supports of the chair. This device, while still visible, was relatively difficult to see or find, and was therefore designated the “difficult” IED for this experiment.
As respondents searched this environment, their behavior was observed for instances of the five error types discussed above. An error of Search was recorded if the respondent examined the same area twice or failed to search across a horizontal or vertical plane. An error of Movement was recorded if the respondent did not move from place to place in the room to maximize visual perspectives. An error of Observation was recorded if the respondent’s eyes were directed toward a given device but the device was still not reported. A failure to Keep Searching was reported if a respondent stated that he or she was finished without finding all three objects (the search was terminated after three minutes whether or not all three items had been found). Errors of Evaluation were recorded if objects other than the three mock devices were identified as IEDs.
This experiment was also used to address the issue of individual differences raised by the large standard deviations observed in Experiment 1. Specifically, this involved the degree to which individual differences in various abilities might have an impact on IED search and detection per se, or on the degree to which a given trainee might benefit from the training provided. Accordingly, after the respondents had participated in either the control or training condition, and had been subjected to the field test environment, a selected battery of individual-difference measurements was administered. These instruments were as follows:
The Shipley Institute of Living Scale (e.g., Shipley, 1940, 1953; also see Shipley, Gruber, Martin, & Klein, 2009). This venerable instrument provides a broad assessment of cognitive functioning in verbal and abstraction format.
Portions of the Digit Span Test of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales.(e.g, Wechsler 2008). Items 5, 6, and 7 of each of the Backward and Forward scales were used to explore possible relationships between respondent attention, short-term memory, and potential success in IED search and detection as examined in this research. The items employed were selected for their approximate correspondence in number of items to average human short-term memory capacity (see Miller, 1956. For most theoretical purposes, the construct of short-term memory has been largely superseded by more current concepts of working memory [e.g., Baddeley, 1990]. However, for some practical purposes such as those developed here, the original parametric concepts of general limitations on “chunking” in short-term human memory remain useful).
Finally, we adapted the Rey-Ostereith Complex Figure Drawing test for our purposes. This is a complex figure which respondents are asked to memorize and draw. On a face-valid level, the ability to observe and process this abstract visual configuration accurately might relate strongly to the ability to observe and process a potentially IED-rich environment. Therefore, we adapted the figure for group administration. The figure was projected on a screen for 30 seconds for respondents. This was followed by participation in three minutes of interpolated arithmetic problems to prevent and control for idiosyncrasies in potential rehearsal. Respondents were then asked to reproduce the figure. Scoring of the resultant reproductions was standardized and conducted according to the scoring format of Meyers & Meyers (1995).
Thus, in Experiment 2, the effect of front-loaded, explicit, feature-intensive training for IED detection was tested. The degree to which errors of the five identified types would be made under training and control conditions was assessed. Finally, specific, face-valid individual differences in general cognitive functioning, short-term memory, and complex visual processing were examined in relation to their roles in IED search and detection both generally and in the ability to benefit from training of the type offered here specifically.
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and ABCHS. All rights reserved. Dr. Robert O'Block, Founder, CEO, and Publisher.
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